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THE IMPACT OF IN-GROUPS AND OUT-GROUPS ON KNOWLEDGE 
SHARING IN RUSSIA AND CHINA  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Management researchers have suggested that knowledge sharing has an important 
role to play in developing competitive advantage for organisations. It could be argued 
that the need to build advantage is even greater in the transition economies that are 
increasingly internationally oriented. Yet, it has been suggested that people in 
transition economies such as Russia and China have a propensity not to share 
knowledge. We proffer that Russians’ and Chinese’ willingness to share knowledge is 
highly influenced by group membership. By examining the extent to which group 
membership influences the processes of knowledge sharing in the Chinese and 
Russian cultural and institutional environments, we theoretically explore how in-groups 
and out-groups facilitate and impede knowledge sharing.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In examining the process of knowledge sharing as it applies in Russia and China, this paper specifically 
addresses how membership of in-groups and out-groups in Russia and China facilitates and impedes 
knowledge sharing. Whereas previous literature has suggested that people in Russia and China are less 
likely to share knowledge than are Western, industrialised nations, we undertake a nuanced assessment 
that suggests that, in some instances, people in these nations may actually have a greater propensity to 
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share knowledge and that this is directly related to the insider status of those individuals involved. Our 
central premise is that knowledge sharing (as related to group membership) is embedded in cultural 
understanding and institutional determinants. These cultural and institutional factors can be key drivers or 
inhibitors of knowledge sharing. The paper is written as a provisional set of arguments that is designed to 
elucidate new ways of thinking about knowledge sharing in Russia and China. 
  
There are several key works that examine knowledge sharing in Russia (Dickenson & Blundell, 2000; 
Holden et. al., 1998; Michailova & Husted, 2003) and several others that study knowledge transfer in 
the Chinese context (Chow et. al., 2002; Lu & Bjorkman, 1997; Tsang et. al., 2002; Wang et. al., 
2001). There is also a significant body of literature that explores the key characteristics of Russian culture 
(Berliner, 1957; Jones, et. al., 1997; Puffer & McCarthy, 1995; Smith, 1976; Yergin & Gustafson, 
1994) and Chinese culture (Bian & Ang, 1997; Buttery & Wang, 1999; Guthrie, 1998; Wright et. al., 
2002; Yang, 2002). Yet, there is a limited amount of research that examines the interface between 
specific national cultural features and knowledge sharing behaviour. Nor is there much research that 
directly examines the interplay of institutions and knowledge sharing in transition economies. Investigating 
this is a highly ambitious task. We have chosen to undertake this task by analysing these interfaces 
through the prism of group membership. 
 
In examining knowledge sharing in Russia, Michailova and Husted (2003) found that the potential value 
of knowledge sharing is often defeated by what they term “knowledge sharing hostility” which may result 
from: (a) the behaviour of knowledge transmitters; (b) the behaviour of knowledge receivers; or (c) the 
transmitter's and receiver's shared understanding of the content of the knowledge. Michailova and 
Husted (2003) argue that the basic problem of knowledge hoarding, as associated with the transmitter’s 
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behaviour, is intensified in the context of many Russian organisations by two specific features. First, 
knowledge hoarding is a mechanism for coping with uncertainty and, second, knowledge hoarding is 
combined with a high respect for hierarchy and formal power. The Not-Invented-Here syndrome is a 
general behavioural problem in knowledge sharing, associated particularly with the behaviour of the 
knowledge receiver. According to Michailova and Husted (2003), in Russian organisations, this 
syndrome is perpetuated by a strong emotional group affiliation among individuals on the one hand and a 
high level of suspicion towards outsiders (and especially Westerners) on the other. Apprehension about 
failures is a well-known obstacle for knowledge sharing among organisational members. The authors 
maintain that this apprehension can be extreme in Russian companies to the extent that it often completely 
blocks action and justifies passivity. 
 
However, while the work done by Husted and Michailova (2002) and Michailova and Husted (2003) 
progresses our understanding of knowledge sharing in the Russian organisational context, it does not 
consider the issue of group membership in terms of the distinction between in-groups and out-groups. 
This may explain why they conclude that Russian organisations can be defined as strongly hostile towards 
knowledge sharing. Our paper makes a valuable contribution to the literature in considering group 
membership as an important but largely neglected issue in knowledge sharing, especially in the context of 
Russia and China. We argue that the knowledge sharing process cannot be examined in isolation from 
locally situated meaning that arises from a range of cultural influences on the one hand and institutional 
contexts on the other. Our objective is to contribute to the literature on knowledge sharing in transition 
economies by a) applying insights from the well-established organisational behaviour literature on groups 
and group dynamics and b) moving the focus from a one-nation study to focusing on two major transition 
societies, namely, Russia and China. It is not this paper’s objective to engage in a comparative 
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examination of the impact of group membership on knowledge sharing behaviour in these two societies. 
The literature review we have undertaken suggests that the mainstream organisational writings do not 
examine knowledge sharing and that the knowledge sharing literature does not examine groups in depth. 
Our intention is to address this gap in the literature. The specific research question we explore is: How 
does group membership influence the processes of knowledge sharing among individuals in the Chinese 
and Russian cultural and institutional context? 
 
The paper is organised into three major sections. We begin with a short review of the literature on 
knowledge sharing with a special focus on impediments to the process of knowledge sharing. We then 
map the organisational behaviour literature on groups and group interaction and outline key theoretical 
contributions regarding the distinction between in-groups and out-groups. The second section argues for 
the importance of relating group membership and knowledge sharing behaviour in the Russian and 
Chinese context. In so doing, we investigate the interface between the two by considering both cultural 
and institutional influences. The third, and concluding, section of the paper outlines future research 
directions related to this topic.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Knowledge sharing 
In the context of this paper 'knowledge’ will be taken to mean “a fluid mix of framed experience, values, 
contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating 
new experiences and information” (Davenport & Prusak, 1998: 5). In similar terms, Helmers (1999: 1) 
points out that knowledge is “accumulation of information and experience that allows people to react to 
new situations by synthesizing a response from past data and actions”. We adopt the definition of 
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‘knowledge sharing’ as providing one’s knowledge to others as well as receiving knowledge from others 
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998). 
 
It is impossible to address meaningfully knowledge sharing in groups and organisations without 
acknowledging that knowledge resides with individuals. Understanding knowledge sharing  is, to a large 
extent, about understanding the thinking and the experiences of the individual who possesses, provides 
and seeks knowledge. This is not to say that social factors are irrelevant (see Spender’s work on social 
knowledge (1996); Dibello & Spender, 1996; Spender & Grant, 1996). However, staying at the 
individual level best serves the purposes of this paper and explicitly addressing other levels of analysis 
would divert our attention from answering the research question posed in the beginning of the paper. 
 
Knowledge sharing is in reality not as natural and self-evident as often presented in the knowledge 
management literature. To say that organisations can be built and exist on shared knowledge is an 
unrealistic and idealised view. An assumption that underlies much of the knowledge management writing 
is that people will happily transmit the knowledge they possess to others or tap into the collective 
corporate knowledge base in order to find a solution to their problem merely because such systems have 
been made available to them (Sbarcea, 2001). Instead, individual resistance to knowledge sharing is a 
phenomenon that widely dominates organisational reality. Referring to knowledge sharing across 
specialities, Postrel (1999: 304) describes the situation in the following metaphorical way:  
 
“Mutual ignorance across specialities is usually optimal, but there are key interactions 
where shared knowledge is important, and those key interactions are just the ones that 
attract scholarly and managerial attention. This answer to the theoretical puzzle leads to 
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a knowledge-based view of management as being concerned with selecting, operating, 
and governing ‘islands of shared knowledge in a sea of mutual ignorance.’” 
 
There are several difficulties in the process of knowledge sharing and those that are relevant for our 
discussion are addressed below. 
 
First of all, knowledge is always developed locally. Thus it is, by definition, embedded in a certain 
cognitive and behavioural context. Without understanding the context, one cannot inquire into the 
reasoning and the assumptions behind the particular piece of knowledge. This makes knowledge sharing 
highly problematic and sometimes impossible. Acquiring an understanding of the context is in itself a 
complicated and effort demanding process. The initial cost of becoming familiar with a particular context 
might be rather high and since the process of keeping familiarity with the particular context is a 
continuous one, there are additional incremental costs associated with adding new features to the state of 
“knowing” the context. Additionally, since the context is a dynamic construction, it may become subject 
to sudden and radical changes rather than continuous and incremental ones. In this case, new learning 
investments (and thus new high costs) may be needed in order to become familiar with the changed 
context.  
 
Second, knowledge is asymmetrically distributed in any organisation. Often those who possess  the 
knowledge are not inclined to invest time and energy to share it without expecting to get something in 
return (promise of reciprocity), as these resources are finite and thus, scarce in people’s workday 
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998; O’Dell & Grayson, 1998; McLaughlin, 1995). Both the society and the 
firm face the problem of how to use widely dispersed knowledge, and, therefore, how to extend the span 
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of utilisation of resources in a way that exceeds the span of control of any one mind (Tsoukas, 1996: 
12). Closely related to this is the phenomenon of ‘bounded rationality’, i.e. being faced with a problem, 
people tend to come up with a solution which is ‘good enough’ or ‘satisfying’ as opposed to engaging in 
higher search costs in order to locate the optimal solution to the particular problem (March, 1978; 
Simon, 1957).  Neither individuals nor groups or organisations operate continuously on an entirely 
‘rational’ basis. Instead, they exercise different skills and preferences for dealing with knowledge of a 
particular nature in a particular manner. At a more concrete level, the knowledge that is sought may exist 
somewhere in the same organisation and even in the same department, but because people are not aware 
of where it resides and because there are costs associated with locating it, it may remain non-accessible 
to them.  
 
Third, efficient knowledge sharing involves direct commitment on both sides of the exchange, both on the 
transmitter and the receiver side. To start with, if the potential knowledge transmitter is not aware that 
someone in the organisation would be interested in the knowledge she/he possesses, she/he will not 
actively participate in sharing this knowledge. Similarly, if the potential receiver is not aware of the 
existence of a particular piece of knowledge, she/he will not be able to seek it. The closer the relationship 
between the knowledge provider and receiver, the more knowledge the provider is willing to share 
(Bouty, 2000). Trust is crucial here in the sense that the provider needs to trust that the receiver will not 
exploit the shared knowledge for purposes other than those agreed upon, implicitly as well as explicitly 
(Bouty, 2000). 
 
Fourth, an individual’s ability to appreciate new knowledge is a function of their individual pre-existing 
knowledge. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) refer to this as “absorptive capacity”: if an individual does not 
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possess the needed pre-existing knowledge, new knowledge may be acquired in principle, but not well 
utilised because the individual does not already have the appropriate contextual knowledge necessary to 
make the new knowledge fully intelligible. Von Krogh et al. (2000) describe people as dealing with twin 
processes of assimilation and accommodation. Assimilation, in this respect, refers to the process of 
integrating input from the environment into one’s existing experiences. When individuals encounter new 
situations for which they have no ready or clear responses, accommodation dominates instead. This is a 
process by which people give meaning to new input, distinguishing it as something that lies beyond what 
they already know. When accommodation becomes too challenging, individual barriers to appreciating 
new knowledge appear.  
 
Fifth, knowledge sharing is a voluntary act (Dixon, 2002: 37). Nonaka (1994) suggests that efficient 
knowledge sharing depends on the willingness of individuals to identify to the organisation the knowledge 
they possess and to share knowledge when required. Human behaviour is inherently opportunistic; issues 
such as adverse selection and moral hazard may influence the individual’s motivation to share knowledge 
in a negative manner. 
 
Knowledge resides in people’s minds where it tends to be more tacit as opposed to being relatively well 
articulated (Gersick & Hackman, 1990; Leonard-Barton, 1992). This separation in the typology should 
not be interpreted as implying that tacit knowledge can be rigidly compartmentalised in the real world 
(Brown & Woodland, 1999). Polanyi (1966: 6) has pointed out that knowledge is an integrating force 
that binds and shapes all knowledge. Hansen et al. (1999) refer to this as the codification vs. 
personalisation dilemma. Codification processes are largely based on technologies and rely primarily on 
intranets, electronic repositories, databases, etc. The personalisation strategy emphasises knowledge 
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sharing among individuals, groups and organisations through social networking and/or engaging in 
communities of practice (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Hansen et al., 1999; Wenger 1998). 
 
A largely ignored issue in the literature on knowledge sharing is how it is affected by group membership 
and group dynamics. The following section of the paper maps the organisational behaviour literature on 
group composition and group processes before the paper links the latter to knowledge sharing processes 
in in-groups and out-groups, particularly in the Russian and Chinese context. 
 
Groups, group interaction and in-groups vs out-groups 
“Knowledge” is not a central construct in the organisational behaviour literature. There are, however, a 
number of aspects that are implicitly included in discussions of different issues in the literature on groups 
and group dynamics.  
A group has been defined as two or more people who interact and are dependent upon each other to 
achieve some common objective. Interdependence is the crucial aspect that determines the difference 
between a group and a collective. Within a group each person influences and is influenced by each other 
person (Shaw, 1971: 10). A group differs from a team in that a team is a specific form of a group that 
has highly defined tasks and roles. Shaw (1971: 5) suggests that groups may be defined in terms of 
having one or more of the following characteristics: perceptions and cognitions; motivation and need 
satisfaction; group goals; group organisation; interdependency of group members; and, interaction. Tosi 
et. al., (2000: 233) reduce this to four factors critical to group formation including: personal 
characteristics; interests and goals; potential to influence; and, opportunity for interaction. Shaw (1971: 
9-10) further argues that if a group exists it may be assumed that its members are a) motivated to join the 
group expecting that it will satisfy some of their needs, and b) are aware of its existence i.e. that their 
perceptions are veridical.  
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Cartwright and Zander (1968) identified eight orientations for the analysis of group interaction. Shaw 
(1971) refers to a ninth but notes that of the nine, only three have contributed greatly to the theoretical 
analysis of group behaviour – systems theory (including interaction theory), psychoanalytical orientation, 
and empirical-statistical orientation. Interaction theory understands the group as a system of interacting 
individuals. Three basic elements are identified, including: activity, interaction; and, sentiment. Interaction 
theory suggests that all aspects of group behaviour can be understood by analysing the relations among 
these three basic elements. Systems theory describes the group as a series of interlocking elements such 
as positions and roles, with much emphasis on group inputs and outputs (Shaw, 1971: 14-17). 
 
Moreover, a number of theoretical approaches have been adopted that have assisted in understanding 
groups and group behaviour. Of these, the most comprehensive analysis is exchange theory. Thibaut & 
Kelley’s (1959) exchange theory assumed that the existence of a group was based solely on the 
participation and satisfaction of individuals in a group. The key concepts of the theory revolve around 
interpersonal relationships, interaction, behaviour sequence, and behaviour repertoire. The central feature 
of interaction is the interpersonal relationship and two persons are said to have formed a relationship if 
they meet to interact on several occasions (Shaw, 1971: 28). It should be noted, however, that some 
authors have advocated that membership in a group per se may be rewarding to an individual apart from 
the group activities or purposes (Shaw, 1971: 97). This need to feel part of a group or be affiliated with 
others, referred to as the “affiliation want”, is said to be one of four instincts that govern people’s lives 
(Trotter, 1920). Later theorists questioned the need for affiliation but nevertheless posited such a need as 
playing an important role in social groupings (McClelland et. al., 1953; Maslow, 1954). 
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In-groups and out-groups 
Organisational behaviour literature, and group dynamics literature specifically, devotes some discussion 
to the notion of in-groups and out-groups. Triandis (1988) defined an in-group as a group of people who 
share common interests and have a concern for each other’s welfare, and whose members may include 
family, distant relatives, co-workers, and members of political and/or religious groups to which an 
individual belongs. Tajfel’s (1982) suggests that individuals form in-groups based on mutual interests and 
common traits since they are most likely to receive reinforcement for such traits from similar others. This 
view of in-group/out-group relationships is supported by Tsui and O’Reilly (1989) and Zenger and 
Lawrence (1989). It is further argued that in-group members will view their long-term welfare in terms of 
the successes of the group (Earley, 1993).  
 
Importantly, Triandis (1988) notes that in-group membership is culturally variable. Earley (1993) 
reaffirmed that people in individualist and collectivist cultures place differing value on in-groups and out-
groups. His findings suggest that the performance of individualists who thought they were working in an 
in-group or out-group was lower than the performance of individualists working alone, whereas 
collectivists’ performance was lower in an individual or out-group context than in an in-group context. 
 
Graen et. al., (1972) defined the concept of in-group and out-group membership in the context of a 
vertical dyad linkage model of leadership, in which an individual’s relationship to a work group is largely 
a function of each member’s association with an in-group or out-group. In this theory, group membership 
status depends upon an individual’s relationship to the group’s leader. Within vertical dyad linkage 
theory, leader-member relationships are classified into in-group and out-group categories (Tosi et. al., 
2000: 476). In in-groups, relationships between leaders and subordinates are close and participants note 
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more positive orientation to the job, whereas in out-groups relationships, the subordinates are less 
involved in decision-making (Dienesch & Liden, 1986; Liden & Graen, 1980). 
 
Moreover, the literature on intergroup conflict highlights changes in attitudes and behaviour between 
groups (the in- and out-groups) when there is intergroup conflict (Feldman & Arnold, 1983). It is 
suggested that four types of dynamics occur. First, there is substantial selective perception about one’s 
own group and a systematic distortion of perceptions about the other groups i.e. positive attribution is 
given to one’s own group and negative attribution to groups of others. Second, there is a shift from a 
problem-solving orientation toward other groups to a win-lose position (Filley, 1977). Third, there is 
increased hostility toward the rival group. Levine & Campbell (1972) refer to this as an ethnocentrism in 
which members of other groups are seen as contemptible and inferior. Fourth, interaction and 
communication between the groups decreases which makes it easier for groups to maintain their negative 
stereotypes of other groups. Importantly, whatever information is passed between groups is very 
carefully rationed and sometimes deliberately distorted (Feldman & Arnold, 1983). 
 
A smaller body of literature has analysed the existence of in-groups and out-groups even in situations 
where there is no direct conflict. For instance, in Bouwen’s (2001) article on knowing in an 
organisational context, reference is made to the in-group/out-group nature of departments within 
organisations and it is proffered that such distinctions can be manifest in power strife between such 
departments. Moreover, Granitz and Ward (2001) argue that individuals will be more likely to share in 
ethical reasoning and moral intent with members of their own functional group (the in-group) than with 
members of other functional groups (the out-group/s). Further, when perceptual sharing is compared to 
actual sharing, their results demonstrated that individuals understate their sharing of ethical reasoning and 
 13
moral intent with out-groups and overstate their sharing with in-group members (Granitz & Ward, 2001). 
  
  
The literature on in-groups/out-groups is closely related to the literature on trust. According to Dixon 
(2002), the better a group of people knows each other, the more people in the group will call on each 
other’s knowledge. It is argued that people’s perceptions of their own interdependence with other 
groups influences both their beliefs about group members’ trustworthiness and their affection for group 
members, and this in turn, effects interpersonal trust development (Williams, 2001). However, Williams 
(2001) suggests that the similarity-trust, dissimilarity-distrust paradigm that has shaped previous literature 
is inadequate for explaining how trust may develop between members of dissimilar groups. She suggests 
that cooperative and competitive out-group interdependence is more critical than in-group identification 
for understanding the range of influences that dissimilar group membership can have on trust development 
because out-group interdependence may generate either positive or negative beliefs and feelings about an 
out-group (Williams, 2001).  
 
In-groups and out-groups in the Russian and Chinese context 
The distinction between in-groups and out-groups influences relationships to a high extent in the transition 
economies. Individuals feel a moral obligation towards their in-group and a lack of interest in those that 
are considered the out-group. The boundary between the individuals’ in-group and other groups is very 
distinctive and salient (Iyengar et. al., 1999). Strong trust will be felt in in-group others but weaker, or 
complete lack of, trust in out-group others (Chen et. al., 2002). There is often hostility toward out-group 
members (Triandis, 1988). Thus, it is argued that the in-group becomes the mode of transaction for these 
societies (Boisot  & Child, 1999: 246).  
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In China, one’s membership of in-groups affects all daily activities be they in the economic or social 
sphere.  The value of in-groups is inextricably linked to trust and dependency with others . Those who 
fall out of a personalised network are regarded as out-group members and they do not share benefits of 
networking with in-group members. Moreover, due to the interdependent relationships in an in-group, 
individuals are motivated to save face for in-group members (Sheer & Chen, 2003). Littrell (2002) 
suggests that the in-group is the source of identity, protection, and loyalty, and in exchange for such 
loyalty, knowledge can be expected to be shared within the group but would be expected to be 
restricted to those considered to be outside the group. Indeed, the only way in which one is able to 
access knowledge from an outsider is to work towards the ascription of insider status or work through 
intermediaries who already possess insider status. Achieving insider status is critical in order to achieve 
very diverse outcomes (Krug & Belschak, 2001; Leung et. al., 1996).     
 
In Russia, strong collective instincts were born in the countryside in the pre-revolutionary time. Long 
before the Soviet state, collective farming was encouraged by the Tsars because of their fear of anarchy. 
Ethics of the obshina, the commune of villagers, was embedded in the peasant psychology and often 
carried from the farm to the factory when peasants migrated to cities (Smith, 1990). People who 
belonged to the obshina lived together, worked at the fields together and were accustomed to a 
common fate. Socialism has perpetuated this group thinking and behaving through ignoring the 
importance of individuals. Ashwin’s (1996) research found that Russian workers identify three distinct 
forms of collectivity: the symbolic collectivity of the enterprise as a whole; the collective identification of 
the ordinary workers; and, the collectivity of the immediate work group. Most importantly, she also 
highlights that in each case the collective is defined negatively in relation to the outside. Evidence of the 
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in-group focus has been notable also in Russian organisations in the years of post-socialist 
transformation. Elites who are insiders have been able to co-opt resources of state organisations to 
develop their own companies (Avraamova, 1995; Sedaitis, 1997) through utilising their in-group 
membership).  
 
 
THE IMPACT OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP ON  
KNOWLEDGE SHARING IN RUSSIA AND CHINA 
Cultural Influences  
National culture influences a person's actions, either by the in-built values toward which the actions are 
oriented, or in shaping a repertoire of strategies of action favouring or discouraging certain patterns of 
action (Hofstede, 2001; Smith, 1992; Triandis, 1989). Attitudes and behaviour exhibited in relation to 
knowledge sharing are greatly affected by national cultural characteristics. We focus the discussion that 
follows on personal networking for three particular reasons: a) networking is culturally embedded; b) 
networks are explicitly related to group membership; and c) personal networking has a number of 
distinct features in the Chinese and Russian context.  
While Russia’s European orientation has meant that it has not quite had the same degree of collaborative 
tendencies as China (Veiga et. al., 1995) both nations are considered to be highly in-group focused. 
China’s in-group orientation comes essentially from a Confucian tradition  (Bian & Ang, 1997) and was 
reinforced by Marxist-Leninist-Maoism. As stated above, Russia’s in-group orientation results from the 
strong sense of commonality developed in the pre-revolutionary times and was easily detected in the 
socialist collectivist-autocratic system in which there was no place for the individual and her/his own way 
of thinking and behaving (Garrison & Artemeyev, 1994). Personal networks in Russia and China, blat or 
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guanxi, differ from the West in terms of how extensively they are rooted and activated in social and 
business life and how business success is influenced by the quality and cultivation of networks 
(Michailova & Worm, 2002). While it can be argued that personal networks certainly also exist in the 
West, the form and function they take in Russia and China are much more ritualised and an all-pervasive 
discourse. An important aspect to relationship building is the achievement of insider status  (becoming 
part of the in-group). According to Buttery and Wang (1999), in China having acquired a good friend 
with whom one has trust, the foundation is laid for doing business. A major development occurs when 
one brings the former outsider into one’s close network of friends – they become an insider. Russians, 
like the Chinese, also prefer strong personal relationships in which there is a shared set of norms and 
rules (Puffer & McCarthy, 1995; Yergin & Gustafson, 1994). Triandis (1989) argues that persons in 
such group-focused cultures tend to have only a few in-groups that are stable over time, yet once formed 
the relationships are often valued over personal needs.   
 
In Russia and China, business transactions follow the development of personal relationships.  Russians 
and Chinese prefer to get to know people and ascertain whether they are worthy of having trust 
bestowed on them before they will consider someone as a suitable partner in a business venture.  Both 
Russians and Chinese view relationship building as their first priority in business. Generally Russians and 
Chinese will only share knowledge if they already have a relationship with an individual and have taken 
them into their in-group. The notion of trust (xinyong in China, doverie in Russia) is, in turn, reflective of 
the knowledge that the trustor has of the trustee. The decision to trust a person and share knowledge 
with him/her depends greatly upon having knowledge of that individual. This knowledge is usually 
provided through the relationship network (guanxiwang in China or set’ blatnyih in Russia).  Emotional 
trust, which is more important in Russia and China than cognitive trust, is based on centiment-based ties 
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between individuals (for instance, friendships) and can be extended to others through the relationship 
network (Gao & Ting-Toomey, 1998). A distinction is noted in Russia in that Russians may actually 
build relationships on the basis of having some negative information about an individual i.e. trust results 
from a form of protecting information (Michailova & Worm, 2002: 9). Where a relationship is built on 
trust as a positive affirmation it can be expected that knowledge will be shared amongst those who trust. 
 Where a relationship is built upon protecting knowledge, the converse will occur i.e. knowledge will not 
be shared with the individual who is in a relationship simply by virtue of knowledge being held by the 
other individual in the relationship. 
 
Both Russians and Chinese focus on relationships created over long periods of time that are built on 
frequent exchanges rather than the sporadic, discrete in time exchanges favoured in more individualist 
societies. This is significant for knowledge sharing in that Chinese people are much more likely to share 
knowledge when they have a long-term relationship established and an in-group exists. Whereas in most 
Western nations task relationships between managers and subordinates are separate from other dealings, 
in Russia and China interactions with another are viewed as part of a whole relationship, i.e. hierarchical 
relationships that exist in the workplace are also replicated in a social setting. When two individuals have 
a relationship or are in-group members, they know a great deal about the other individual’s private life; 
there simply is not the sharp divide between public and private noted in Northern European and Anglo 
Saxon cultures.  
 
Institutional Influences  
While the foregoing examines the effects of a few cultural conventions on knowledge sharing it should 
also be noted that the Communist socio-political institutions also have reinforced the disposition towards 
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not sharing knowledge with those outside one’s in-group. Throughout the Communist eras in Russia and 
China people were encouraged to conform, not to deviate from the group, to accept top-down 
authoritative decision-making, to perform to a given standard but not beyond that, and not to admit 
mistakes. The Chinese had elements of these practices in their Confucian heritage that placed emphasis 
on acquiescence to authority, social harmony and conformity at all costs. The Russians also had a cultural 
heritage of being strongly group focused, a tradition that was publicly operationalised by the Communist 
political leadership. Moreover, it has been argued that in both Russia and China the cultivation of 
personal connections has proved a substitute for reliable government and established rule of law and that, 
in the absence of effective state institutions as regulators of transactions, and in dynamically changing 
contingencies, personal networks and in-groups have become endemic to doing business (Xin & Pearce, 
1996). 
 
Russia and China were both ruled by the Communist Party for more than fifty years, a time in which the 
Party placed itself (and, in the case of China, continues to place itself) above the law (Chai, 1998; Yergin 
& Gustafson, 1994). The lack of rule by law means that accessing external knowledge necessitates 
having in-group status with those that have the knowledge. The lawlessness that characterises China 
under Communist rule (and continues to characterise Russia post-Communism) means that rules can be 
interpreted very differently according to one’s position in society i.e. whether one has insider status with 
the necessary authorities. The existing  rules and regulations are easily violated and written contracts have 
little value. In the absence of well-developed legal and distribution systems, personal relationships, 
particularly at bureaucratic and local political levels, are essential to getting anything done. Although legal 
procedures are being established in China in the wake of WTO admission, informal contacts have not 
lost their significance as they provide access to not only goods and services (through substantial black 
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market dealing) but also knowledge. Although Russia is changing its legal system, traditional practices 
continue being not merely exercised, but playing a powerful role in the business discourse.  
 
The insufficient regulatory environment in Russia and China has manifest in a “culture of fear”. This 
reinforces an unwillingness of individuals to share knowledge with those who are not part of their in-
group and with whom they do not feel trust. China’s neutrality to others and reticence to share 
knowledge with outsiders is based on Confucian tradition and it was also reinforced during the Cultural 
Revolution. Littrell (2002: 22) notes that during this period of destruction, trust was diminished amongst 
Chinese because of the “often fatal denunciations from co-workers, friends, casual acquaintances, and 
even family, so any openness, initiative, and expressions of talent or uniqueness were effectively 
programmed out of the public personality of the Chinese.”  Consequently, the Chinese have developed a 
tendency to be unprepared to share  knowledge because of their perception that saying too much can 
result in serious repercussions from the military polit-bureau. As the people that lived through the Cultural 
Revolution are now in middle and senior management positions in China, their ethos of not sharing 
knowledge has permeated down the ranks of organisations. To overcome this inbuilt tendency, a high 
level of trust needs to be established before individuals will feel “safe” in sharing their knowledge with 
outsiders. However, while it is generally assumed that Chinese will not discuss subjects considered to be 
politically sensitive, they are usually relatively willing to do so with those that are part of their trusted in-
group.  
 
Russians too may be fearful to share their knowledge because of perceived repercussions of doing so.  
Russia’s Communist history has trained people to keep things to themselves not least because of a fear 
that the shared knowledge could be misinterpreted, often deliberately, and hence could harm the person 
providing information while being beneficial to the person receiving that information. Lawrence and 
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Vlachoutsicos (1990) argue that Russians do not share information with outsiders unless they have been 
given explicit instructions to do so.  Russians have a tendency to gather much knowledge but to hoard 
that knowledge, perhaps to use to advantage at some point in the future. Russia’s Communist heritage 
implied that people in in-groups were uncomfortable with members of out-groups. The historical isolation 
from Western Europe also made Russians very hostile towards non-Russians. Though passive towards 
government (Ledeneva et. al., 2000), Russians are also cynical and suspicious of authority. As such, they 
are very secretive in public, are suspicious of external knowledge and believe all rumours  (Lewis, 1999). 
 Further, Russia’s ancestral suspiciousness of the West remains just below the surface and can easily be 
provoked (Holden et. al., 1998: 238). This results in a climate in which Russians will be very careful not 
to share knowledge with perceived hostile aggressors.   
 
Despite this seeming unwillingness to share knowledge for fear of the repercussions, Russians are very 
open with those who are part of their trusted in-group. Indeed, Husted and Michailova (2002: 24) argue 
that the strong attachment that Russians feel towards their own group makes them resistant to ideas from 
outside that are viewed as having the potential to disrupt both the stability of the existing group and the 
order and continuity of the organisation.  Moreover, if Russians do not accept knowledge from others, 
they believe that they can not only maintain the status quo but also preserve the integrity of their own 
knowledge that might be viewed as less relevant/valuable if outside information is deemed applicable. 
 
The widespread corruption and thriving black economies in Russia and China also have implications for 
knowledge sharing in that any knowledge can be acquired for a price so long as one has the necessary 
resources and insider contacts. Gaining introduction to useful people remains extremely important in 
Russia; in cases when people have no resources to blat, people will resort to bribes (Ashwin, 1996). 
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Bribery, corruption and the criminal “second” society are all part of criminal legacy of the “economy of 
favours” in Russia (Ledeneva, 1998). In the case of China, Hilton (1996) questions whether corruption 
has become systemic. The use of bribery is universally condemned, particularly now that there has been 
the introduction of laws specifically dealing with corruption, and the government has made a point of 
executing thousands to make the point that it is serious about cracking down on corruption. Yet, while 
giving cash is usually viewed as buying someone’s services and hence is condemned, gift giving is 
universal (Yang, 2002). Luo (1997) argues that the difference between what is an acceptable gift and 
what is an improper bribe depends on arbitrary, delicately poised cultural conventions that vary 
according to situation. Yet, while some practices are increasingly viewed as backdoor (Guthrie, 1998: 
255), many other historical conventions remain de rigueur. This has important implications for 
knowledge sharing in that it remains very difficult to develop and maintain good business relationships 
without engaging in some degree of favours, and knowledge sharing depends upon maintaining 
relationships through favours. Beyond that, though, despite anti-bribery laws, paying bribes (to a member 
of one’s in-group) is still a very effective way of ensuring access to knowledge as well as preventing 
knowledge from being shared. 
 
Institutionalised work practices have also had an important influence on people’s willingness to share 
knowledge. Notably, not only are Russians and Chinese generally unprepared to accept knowledge from 
outside but they are also reticent to believe that knowledge can be acquired bottom-up in organisations. 
Most Russian managers have difficulties accepting the fact that they can learn from employees from 
lower levels (Michailova & Husted, 2003). A possible explanation in our framework is that managers 
and employees perceive each other as belonging to out-groups. Subordinates often intentionally hoard 
their knowledge, anticipating that their superiors would not promote them if they demonstrate in public 
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that they are more knowledgeable than their superiors. While the lack of rewards and incentives for 
sharing knowledge tends to work against employees initiating, the cultural traditions also reinforce the 
lack of institutional incentives for taking initiatives. That is, the strong hierarchical and authoritarian 
traditions within organisations mean that managers are threatened by participatory styles of management 
and employees do not want to involve themselves in decision making for fear of having their views 
rejected (Chen et. al., 2002; Welsh et. al., 1993). Also, in the case of China, for an employee to provide 
a suggestion to their senior manager would cause considerable loss of face for both parties. The manager 
looks inadequate and is disgraced for not having first thought of the proposal and the employee is 
humiliated for shaming his/her superior.  While Western rewards systems are quickly being adopted in 
China as the number of strategic alliances with western partners increases, traditions of formality, 
hierarchy and command are much slower to change. Moreover, Jackson & Bak (1998) suggest that 
unethical behaviour continues to be tolerated in organisations in China because employees will not share 
knowledge of superiors’ indisgressions. To this end it can be argued that there is not only disincentive to 
share knowledge but there is actually a clear rationale for withholding knowledge from the out-group and 
preserve the stability of the in-group. 
 
Compounding reticence to share knowledge is the fact that during the Communist era both Russians and 
Chinese were trained to not admit mistakes. This reflects not having a Western orientation which views 
mistakes as learning opportunities. In China it is also associated with face saving, the need not to 
conform and not to deviate from the in-group. Russians and Chinese have been employed in very 
hierarchical, authoritarian organisations in which mistakes were viewed as costly and to be avoided, and 
hence, not to be admitted. The corresponding absence of feedback on performance (and opportunity to 
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reflect) has contributed to an unwillingness to share learning experiences and knowledge of how to avoid 
repeating mistakes. 
 
In sum, there are key cultural and institutional influences associated with in-groups and out-groups that 
impact on the willingness or unwillingness of Russians and Chinese to share knowledge. While our 
research has provided a linkage between organisational behaviour literature on groups and knowledge 
sharing literature, there are still other avenues associated with this topic that warrant investigation. 
 
ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In this paper we have examined the impact that group membership in Russia and China has on 
knowledge sharing. This had not been previously explored in detail in the literature. However, we have 
not examined the converse, namely the impact that knowledge sharing has on group membership. We 
suggest that as a culture of knowledge sharing emerges in transition economies, it is very likely to impact 
on group membership in the sense that groups could be expected to form in different ways and for 
different reasons and to reflect different membership patterns than have existed to-date. Thus, it would 
be beneficial to undertake longitudinal research to examine the changes to group membership that result 
from the development of organisational cultures that support knowledge sharing.  Additionally, we have 
not undertaken a comparative assessment of the differences between Russia and China in respect to how 
knowledge sharing is influenced by certain cultural and institutional features. Significant future research 
could provide a nuanced assessment of the subtle differences in-group membership in the two nations 
and explore the ways in which the cultural and institutional differences between the two determine the 
extent to which knowledge sharing occurs. 
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The rationale for this paper was to develop a set of theoretical arguments in relation to the interface 
between group membership and knowledge sharing in the context of two transition economies. It would 
be highly desirable that future research generates empirical data, both qualitative and quantitative, that 
investigates this complex interface. Further, future research could examine other transition economies 
(such as the societies in Central and Eastern Europe). In so doing, researchers could examine whether 
these nations’ closer proximity to Western Europe and their earlier shift to international political and 
economic institutions has resulted in organisational cultures in which there is a greater propensity to share 
knowledge. 
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